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Abstract: This paper investigates disclosure by testing if the game theoretic predictions of unrav-
elling theory are borne out in a heretofore unstudied market. We analyse TripAdvisor disclosures
from hoteliers across 22 locations (N = 4357) and consider the relationship between disclosure and
industry (star) certification. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that disclosure decreases
linearly with TripAdvisor ratings n. We also find the same pattern of disclosure occurs when con-
sumers know the information provider has information to disclose, and when they do not. We also
find evidence suggesting the most elite hotels may disclose less. We provide practical as well as
theoretical implications.
Keywords: disclosure; TripAdvisor; unravelling of information
1. Introduction
In modern markets, the providers of goods and services have widespread opportu-
nities to easily display detailed information concerning their quality. A key principle in
game theory predicts they will all take this opportunity, yet many do not. According to the
game theoretic account, if service providers do not display certain information, rational
consumers should deduce that their services are of extremely poor quality. Consequently,
those service providers will always display relevant information [1–7]. For reasons that
will become clear, the basis of this theory is referred to as “unravelling”—the logical reason-
ing process which leads service providers to conclude that disclosure is the best strategy.
In theory, unravelling results in a separating equilibrium, in that even when there are
information differences, the information holder feels compelled to disclose [8].
Previous empirical field tests of unravelling theory have shown incomplete disclosure.
Most of these tests, however, involve small sample sizes, are limited to a geographically
contained market and/or have not clearly established if the assumptions underlying
unravelling theory are correct. Furthermore, past tests have not considered the effects
of a violation of the model’s assumptions. We contribute to the disclosure literature by
overcoming these data limitations, assessing how a signal diffuses internationally and
evaluating several of the assumption’s underlying unravelling theories. We draw on an
extensive dataset where a point-of-sale disclosure is virtually costless, documenting online
TripAdvisor admissions from 4357 hoteliers in regional and international markets.
This market offers a useful (and economically important1) setting to consider un-
ravelling theory and the supply side of information provision. First, TripAdvisor is an
extremely familiar platform. It is a primary third-party rating agency for hotels and
for many years a recognised source for electronic-word-of-mouth. We can rely on most
consumers knowing about TripAdvisor and knowing that hotels possess a TripAdvisor
rating. This speaks to some possible objections to earlier work—if many consumers do not
know that a provider possesses some information, then the provider faces less pressure
to disclose and, in many cases, will be better off not disclosing. Second, this sector is
dominated by e-commerce, where disclosure is effectively costless. Disclosure simply
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involves a hotel embedding preformatted TripAdvisor code into their website. This is not a
technically challenging task, nor does it involve sacrificing significant space on a website.
Finally, unravelling assumes consumers lack complete information and so the rating is
informative. We are confident this is true for hotel stays, which typically involve travel to a
location/accommodation about which guests have limited knowledge. Given this problem,
trust-based websites such as TripAdvisor have emerged and influence consumer choice
by offering easily interpretable scales. This serves to reduce uncertainty for consumers
when information is incomplete [9–13]. Although consumers can access TripAdvisor by
themselves, if they believe hotels are rational strategic actors, they will assume hotels
will disclose ratings. As an online platform, TripAdvisor is the most important forum
in the tourism industry and the one subject to most academic attention. The collective
judgements provided by the website influence consumer choice. For example, research has
shown a positive relationship between the information posted on TripAdvisor and offline
hotel popularity. Torres, Singh & Robertson-Ring [14] find that encouraging online reviews
and the number of reviews positively affected booking transactions. Xie, Chen & Wu [15]
show that the impact of review quality on TripAdvisor can last for a minimum of two
quarters. Viglia, Minazzi & Buhalis [16] demonstrate that a one-point increase in review
scores increases occupancy rates by 7.5 percentage points and show that the disclosure we
assess in this paper—the review score—has the highest impact on occupancy relative to
other information posted online.
Our key theoretical insights are derived from our assessment of the assumptions
underlying unravelling. Specifically, past tests of unravelling theory are silent on the
topic of consumer expectations. A key assumption of unravelling theory, however, is that
consumers know that providers have information to disclose. Little is known regarding
how consumer expectations interact with a provider’s disclosure decision. Are disclosure
decisions different when a signal’s influence diminishes or when consumers are unaware
that information exists to disclose? The novel disclosure environments we explore allow us
to address these questions. To our knowledge, no test of unravelling theory has compared
disclosure when it is anticipated as opposed to when it is unexpected.
2. Overview
If ratings are important to consumers, should hotels advertise them? Many people
have the intuition that they should do so only if the ratings are relatively favourable [17],
but the logic of unravelling theory is that hoteliers should always display their rating,
unless it is the very worst possible, in which case they should be indifferent whether they
display them or not. To demonstrate this, consider the logical process of unravelling. What
will a hotel do if it has the best possible rating of Five on TripAdvisor? Obviously, they
will advertise this. If all hotels rated as Five disclose, the best non-disclosing hotels are
those with a rating of Four and a half, who will disclose because they will not want to be
pooled with lower rated hotels. The best non-disclosing hotels are then those with a rating
of Four. It is evident that the same unravelling logic will continue to apply to hotels all the
way down the hierarchy of ratings. Even hotels with the lowest rating will be indifferent
between disclosing and not, because by not disclosing they implicitly reveal their rating
is the lowest. Frank [18] has termed this the “full-disclosure principle”, which states that
when “some individuals benefit by revealing a favourable value of some trait, others will
be forced to disclose their less favourable values”.
Our results confirm that, with respect to TripAdvisor ratings, the full-disclosure
principle does not hold. Many hotels, even those with very good ratings, do not disclose
them. Moreover, when they do disclose there is a monotonic relationship between the
rating and disclosure, a result that can best be described as partial unravelling. As we argue
(and as others have argued—c.f., Sah & Read [17]) it is unlikely that the logical argument
just provided is driving this outcome.
Secondly, we observe lower overall rates of disclosure for international hotels, drawn
from major global cities. We argue that this occurs because specific assumptions underlying
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unravelling theory are weakened for international hotels, and therefore the theoretical
prediction is less likely to apply.
Thirdly, we demonstrate that TripAdvisor ratings are more likely to be disclosed in
travel catalogues, a context in which non-disclosure is maximally salient because it is
revealed by comparison with other disclosing hotels. This underlines the importance of
context in eliciting disclosure. When it is easy for consumers to carry out the unravelling
logic, the full disclosure principle is more likely to apply.
Fourthly, we offer further evidence concerning whether firms rely on reputation as
opposed to third-party metrics. We consider the higher-end of the hotel market by evaluat-
ing the disclosure behaviour of elite establishments outside our primary dataset—this is a
hypothesized behaviour where high quality types do not disclose to subtly communicate
their confidence [19]. We only find partial evidence to support this. In our regional sample,
the very finest hotels disclose less compared to elite hotels. This result is not, however,
found in our international sample.
Finally, we show that disclosure decisions (outside our primary market) are non-
strategic in that they are made without consideration of anticipated consumer response to
nondisclosure. We do this by comparing disclosure of TripAdvisor ratings by hotels with
disclosures on a second much less familiar rating platform (TrustPilot).
3. Disclosure and Unravelling Theory
3.1. Basic Theory and Effects
Unravelling theory is central to strategic interactions where an agent who possesses
information relevant to the decisions of another party can credibly (i.e., without lying)
communicate that information in a costless way. As described above, an iterative sequence
of inferences leads to an equilibrium prediction of full disclosure as “enterprises or individ-
uals at the above-average end of the quality spectrum successively distinguish themselves
from the group in a process that unravels from the top down” [1]2. In theory, it is not even
necessary for there to be other agents for the unravelling logic to apply. That is, even if
there was only one hotel in existence that possessed a TripAdvisor rating, and consumers
knew they possessed it, the logic of unravelling would apply. Critically, the unravelling
principle depends on the response of consumers to non-disclosure, and on the awareness
of information providers (the hotel manager) of that consumer response. It is assumed that
consumers will judge non-disclosers in the worst possible light, and information providers
will act accordingly by disclosing unless they are in fact the worst possible.
From a policy perspective, unravelling is appealing as it can improve consumer
welfare without the need for legislation. For instance, rather than legislating hygiene
standards, governments can provide restaurants with hygiene certificates which they can
post voluntarily. Through unravelling, all restaurants with a hygiene rating higher than the
minimum will post their ratings. Any restaurant with a missing rating will invariably have
very poor hygiene, and consumers will know this. In short, the unravelling logic should
guard against adverse selection [20,21]. Examples of the positive implications of high levels
of disclosure include increased trust between buyers and sellers, improved market sorting
(both horizontally and vertically), and the escalation of competitive pressures which can
incentivise inferior agents to improve. Dranove & Jin [22] provide a comprehensive review
of the effects of disclosure, while Sah, Cain & Loewenstein [23] provide insights into the
perversions of mandatory disclosure policies.
As noted, the momentum for disclosure is premised on sellers revealing information
because they believe consumers will interpret nondisclosure rationally. Whether consumers
do this is dubious—a significant body of research has shown that individuals fail to
appreciate, and commonly underestimate, nondisclosure (see Bazerman & Moore [24] for
an overview of these biases and Brown, Camerer & Lovallo [25] for an original application).
Considered solely in the context of disclosure, theoretical and experimental studies are
adding greater weight to the view that consumers make non-optimal and excessively
charitable inferences when information is withheld [26–28]
Games 2021, 12, 73 4 of 20
3.2. Empirical Tests of Unravelling Theory
Unravelling theory has proven challenging to test, and few investigations exist. Field
tests often rely upon a chance regulatory change to disclosure requirements, or some other
variation in field conditions. Furthermore, empirical tests are scarce because historically
centralised rating systems from which to voluntarily disclose positive traits did not exist.
Even if such non-mandatory systems were available, there have been few (if any) practical
methods to verify a disclosure. In the absence of a mechanism to verify costless claims,
disclosures would remain unsubstantiated “cheap talk” [29]. Technological advances have
allowed widely used rating systems to be established and for more detailed empirical
research on unravelling theory. In particular, online commons such as TripAdvisor offer a
medium for the dissemination of non-endogenous ratings scales.
The earliest test of unravelling theory is by Mathios [30] who used scanner data to
study voluntary and mandatory disclosure for salad dressing in American markets after the
1990 Nutrition Labelling Act. He demonstrated a linear relationship between the likelihood
of disclosure and fat content. Virtually all products with under 6 g of fat per serving
disclosed, 60% of those with between 7 and 9 g of fat disclosed and only 20% of those with
between 10 and 20 g disclosed. One limitation to this study is that not all consumers may
hold a preference for less fat, which weakens the prediction of full unravelling.
Jin & Leslie [31] took advantage of legal variations in disclosure requirements to study
the effect of disclosure on hygiene quality regulation where disclosure was voluntary for
one group and mandatory for another. They found that restaurants mandated to disclose
their hygiene ratings improved their hygiene more than restaurants for which disclosure
was voluntary. If voluntary disclosure was equivalent to mandated disclosure, as predicted
by unravelling theory, both groups of restaurants would have felt the same pressure to
disclose and to improve their hygiene.
Jin [32] studied disclosure by analysing accreditation reviews from 1991 to 1998
for Health Maintenance Organizations, a highly competitive market, finding incomplete
voluntary disclosure. Less than half of the organisations disclosed, again contrary to the
full-disclosure principle. Both these studies, however, concern conditions where consumer
awareness of the undisclosed information may have been incomplete, and therefore full
disclosure would not be inevitable, even from sophisticated providers.
Recent empirical tests of unravelling consider the possibility of ‘false modesty’ and
countersignalling [33–35]. Luca & Smith [33] measure disclosure decisions for MBA pro-
grams in American, finding that 65% of 240 business schools publish their ranking, but
the most famous schools (e.g., Harvard and Wharton) countersignal by not disclosing.
Bederson et al. [34] reveal a mixed pattern of signalling and countersignalling. They con-
sider hygiene score card disclosures by restaurants and show that the highest performing
end of the most hygienic restaurant category (A grade) tend to countersignal while lesser
performers still within the best grade disclose.
4. Disclosure and Hotels
There are various practical reasons that make the hotel industry ideal for studying
disclosure. First, the market for hotels is characterised by vertical product differentiation,
with hotels differing greatly in the quality of service they offer. This is the basis for
industry standards. Hotels must also satisfy a range of consumer needs, and TripAdvisor
ratings reflect consumers’ evaluations of the service. This will vary, even within a given
certification. In short, this market offers a clear quality spectrum to test unravelling theory.
Second, hotels have limited ability to “game the system” that matches buyers with
sellers. As hotels do not screen customers systematically, this is likely to increase the
validity of user ratings. Additionally, selective gaming from hoteliers is less likely in the
industry as the market is well-established. Unlike other sectors rated on TripAdvisor, such
as restaurants, hotel markets are not subject to the same level of churn. Hotels incur high
fixed costs, and the market is relatively stable3.
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Third, hotels have a high user turnover and there are many consumers available to
provide ratings. Most are subject to high volume consumer reviews. As visits to hotels
are repeated experience goods, with consumers staying at many hotels, one would expect
guests to be able to compare across hotels and rate performance relative to past experiences.
This increases the reliability of TripAdvisor ratings.
Finally, in contrast to many experience goods where tastes are idiosyncratic, we expect
preferences for hotels to be well-behaved. Hotels have many primary quality dimensions
where “better” is defined unambiguously. Virtually all customers prefer hygienic premises
to unhygienic ones, polite staff to rude ones, larger rooms to smaller, and so on. Well-
behaved preferences are a prerequisite for the unravelling result—the dimensions under
which hotels are reviewed by consumers is compatible with this assumption4.
5. Empirical Framework
To investigate unravelling, two requirements must be met. Firstly, hotels must be
able to credibly report favourable traits to distinguish themselves. TripAdvisor ratings are
easily disclosed and verifiable. These are a summated rating on an ordinal scale from 1 to
5, where half unit ratings are possible. The ratings are derived from a collective assessment
of all reviews and correspond to Excellent (5), Very Good (4), Average (3), Poor (2) and
Terrible (1)5. Second, an instrument to verify whether a trait is disclosed must exist. Due
to the prevalence of digital reservations, hotel websites represent modern shop windows.
These provide researchers with credible data on disclosure decisions.
We collected data by manually searching for TripAdvisor disclosures on each hotel’s
official website. We coded a hotel as disclosing if at least one of the following criteria
was met: (i) the rating was explicitly published on the website or there was an inbuilt
TripAdvisor review section; (ii) the rating was ‘one-click-away’ or there was a distinct (hy-
per)link to the hotel’s TripAdvisor’s webpage; (iii) a specific claim to a hotel’s TripAdvisor
performance was made. Examples are given in the Appendix A.
5.1. Data
We obtained TripAdvisor (non-) disclosures at regional and at international level.
The regional sample comprised hotels in the United Kingdom and Ireland. To ensure a
competitive market was in operation, the locations represented highly populated cities6.
The international sample was drawn from the following cities, each a major tourist hub:
London, New York, Paris, Rome, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo. All the hotels were sourced
from the TripAdvisor platform. Hostels, B&Bs and lodges were excluded. All the hotels
included held an industry star certification.
To be included in the dataset, a hotel needed at least 100 TripAdvisor reviews. This
ensured the rating was reliable and minimised the possibility of deception. The fast pace of
the industry (TripAdvisor widgets are updated daily) and the volume of reviews reduced
the likelihood that gaming could systematically alter the ratings7. Data were accessed on
hotel name, location, star certification, TripAdvisor rating, the number of reviews and the
disclosure decision on the hotel’s official website. All data were collected over two time
periods in 2016 and 2017. In total, data were collected on 4357 hotels across 22 locations.
These ratings were derived from 4,060,830 individual reviews submitted to TripAdvisor.
We also drew on three additional datasets. A holiday catalogue dataset allowed us
to examine the importance of the reservation context and the presence of an intermediary
agent on a TripAdvisor disclosure. With these data we tested if disclosure is more likely
when information is easily comparable across providers [17]. The second dataset consisted
of TripAdvisor rating disclosures from famous and award-winning hotels in the Forbes
Travel Guide. This allowed us to consider if the world’s best hotels choose to rely on
reputation and ignore customers’ evaluations. The third dataset was assembled from
TrustPilot, a platform similar to TripAdvisor but much less well known (especially at the
time we collected our data). While this dataset concerns a different market, it addresses a
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theoretical question—are disclosure decisions based on anticipated consumer responses to
non-disclosure?
5.2. Regional Data–United Kingdom & Ireland
TripAdvisor ratings were obtained for 1490 hotels in sixteen UK and Ireland locations.
We verified if these ratings were disclosed on their official websites. Fifteen hotels were
excluded because they had non-operational websites or had been recently closed, leaving
us with 1475. Table 1 summarises this regional dataset. The TripAdvisor ratings were
based on 1,673,641 reviews. (minimum, 109; maximum, 12,702). We observed the following
quality distribution: 5 (33 hotels), 4.5 (440 hotels), 4 (541 hotels), 3.5 (250 hotels), 3 (96 hotels)
and <3 (115 hotels). Ratings of 3 or lower were categorised into a single category because
they were rare.






Belfast 32 3.5 4.1 1295
Birmingham 78 3.2 3.8 990
Cork 22 3.7 4.2 1097
Coventry 26 3.2 3.6 695
Dublin 113 3.3 3.8 1272
Edinburgh 126 3.5 4.1 1085
Galway 31 3.5 4.1 1047
Kerry 63 3.7 4.3 748
Leeds 46 3.4 4.0 960
Liverpool 60 3.4 4.1 1345
London 686 3.5 3.8 1202
Manchester 72 3.4 3.9 1499
Newcastle 44 3.3 4.0 823
Nottingham 33 3.2 3.7 752
Sheffield 30 3.3 4.0 777
Waterford 13 3.4 3.8 789
Totals 1475 3.4 3.9 1134
5.3. International Data
Data were collected for hotels for seven major international cities. These included
TripAdvisor ratings for 3658 hotels and verified disclosures for 3568. Table 2 summarises
this international dataset. The TripAdvisor ratings for international hotels were based on
3,225,773 reviews (minimum, 100; maximum, 20,037). Consistent with the regional dataset,
six specific class intervals were identifiable: 5 (74 hotels), 4.5 (1008 hotels), 4 (1300 hotels),
3.5 (730 hotels), 3 (270 hotels), <3 (186 hotels).






London 686 3.5 3.8 1202
New York 372 3.6 4.2 1932
Paris 1277 3.3 3.9 509
Rome 755 3.3 3.8 619
Singapore 214 3.5 4.1 1290
Sydney 119 3.8 3.9 1406
Tokyo 145 3.2 4.0 574
Totals 3568 3.4 3.9 901
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6. Analysis
Two contrasting hypotheses are derived from unravelling theory and past empirical
tests: full disclosure (strict theoretical prediction) and selective disclosure (behavioural
prediction). Unravelling theory predicts all hotels will disclose except those with the worst
TripAdvisor rating (who are indifferent between disclosing and not-disclosing). The second
hypothesis had two parts: first, there are fewer TripAdvisor disclosures at every level of
quality (less than full disclosure), and second, the disclosure rate declines monotonically as
quality declines.
The first hypothesis can be safely rejected. For the combined datasets, the aggregate
disclosure rate was only 43%. The observed trend is compatible with the second hypothesis.
Table 3 provides the disclosure rates for each TripAdvisor rating for the complete (merged)
regional and international hotels.
Table 3. Disclosure Rate by TripAdvisor Category—Combined Dataset.
TripAdvisor Rating 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 <3
Complete dataset disclosure (%) 67% 55% 48% 29% 16% 5%
No. of Hotels 83 1253 1642 856 319 204
χ2 4.61 13.82 84.28 18.77 16.34 -
p-value 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
A Kruskal–Wallis test confirmed the differences in disclosure between the six cate-
gories (χ2(5) = 292.17, p = 0.00). Additionally, we tested for differences between adjacent
categories (i.e., 5 to 4.5, 4.5 to 4). The chi-square tests confirmed clear statistical differences
between all adjacent rating intervals. Figure 1 displays the rates of disclosure (black bars)
across the categories, compared to the strict prediction of full disclosure (white bars). For
the lowest ratings, the prediction is either full disclosure or no disclosure, as indicated by
the dashed line8.
Unravelling was similarly incomplete for the regional and international sample. Al-
though 51% of regional hotels disclosed their TripAdvisor rating, this dropped to 41% for
the international sample. As seen in Figure 1, voluntary disclosure decreased as TripAdvi-
sor ratings fell. This supports the second hypothesis of non-random selective disclosure.
Regionally, over 80% of hotels holding a rating of 5 disclosed, but this fell monotoni-
cally to 34% for a rating of 3.5. It is interesting that several hotels rated 5 on TripAdvisor did
not disclose. This is consistent with recent experimental evidence [17]). Only 5% of hotels
receiving a TripAdvisor rating of 3 or lower disclosed a rating. Internationally, a similar
trend was observed. Although this finding is largely consistent with theory, alternative
motivations discussed later may explain the absence. Linearly declining disclosure was
also observed in the international sample. As expected, we observed differences across
the range of intervals for the disaggregated datasets for the regional (KW: χ2(5) = 170.31,
p = 0.00) and international (KW: χ2(5) = 221.28, p = 0.00) data. To consider threshold effects
between rating intervals, Table 4 presents the disclosure proportions for each TripAdvisor
rating, along with the results from chi-square tests comparing adjacent categories. As can
be seen, the lower the TripAdvisor rating, the lower the probability of a disclosure.
Estimating Disclosure
To estimate the probability of a hotel making a disclosure and to build upon our
descriptive analysis, we specified a basic probit model (Equation (1)). This specification
remains consistent across the alternative estimations that follow. The dependent variable
was categorical where DISCLOSURETA was 1 for a disclosure (0 otherwise). The covariates
were dummy variables indicating if a TripAdvisor rating fell within a class interval. For
the purposes of regression, the reference category consisted of hotels in the lowest rating
category. Location fixed effects were included.
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DISCLOSURETA = α0 + β1(rating5) + β2(rating4.5) + β3(rating4) + β4(rating3.5) + β4(rating3) + β5(rating < 3) + β5 (Location) + ε (1)
Marginal effects for seven different samples, beginning with the entire dataset, are
reported in Table 5 These results confirm how differences in disclosure vary in response
to a ceteris paribus change in a covariate and identify the linearity apparent in Figure 1.
A measure of localised fit is also reported9. As only two location effects are identified,
these coefficients are not included in the results. The two incidences where hotel location
statistically influenced disclosure (Paris and Rome) are subject to explicit analysis.
Table 5. Probit Results–Marginal Effects.
OV = <3
Hotels




Sample Combined UK & Ireland London Provincial BI International Paris Rome
Rating 5 0.755 *** 0.920 *** 0.814 *** - 0.739 *** 0.601 *** 0.496 **
(0.070) (0.107) (0.111) - (0.075) (0.130) (0.163)
Rating 4.5 0.640 *** 0.729 *** 0.684 *** 0.727 *** 0.639 *** 0.402 *** 0.501 ***
(0.050) (0.064) (0.071) (0.128) (0.057) (0.105) (0.110)
Rating 4 0.577 *** 0.620 *** 0.681 *** 0.510 *** 0.607 *** 0.423 *** 0.475 ***
(0.051) (0.065) (0.071) (0.131) (0.057) (0.104) (0.109)
Rating 3.5 0.395 *** 0.420 *** 0.446 *** 0.361 * 0.431 *** 0.381 *** 0.264
(0.053) (0.071) (0.081) (0.139) (0.059) (0.106) (0.114)
Rating 3 0.242 *** 0.329 *** 0.308 *** 0.408 * 0.258 *** 0.120 0.072
(0.059) (0.082) (0.095) (0.159) (0.066) (0.118) (0.129)
N 4357 1475 686 545 3568 1277 755
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.08
Significance level: 1%: ***; 5%: **; 10% *. All pooled regressions include location FE.
The first regression (I) in Table 5 displays the marginal effects for the entire dataset.
Relative to the reference group (<3), hotels rated from 3 to 5 were more likely to disclose
their TripAdvisor rating. The likelihood of disclosure increased with the TripAdvisor
rating; for the merged dataset, elite hotels (rated 5—excellent) were 75% more likely to
reveal their performance. The second series of estimates (II) shows the probability of a
disclosure for regional hotels only. This allowed us to consider local and state specific
effects10. The highest rated hotels were 92% more likely to disclose relative to the worst for
the complete regional sample—this is a clear trigger to initiate unravelling.
As London accounts for 46% of the regional data, it is considered separately (II).
London represents a major international city and tourist hub, in comparison to smaller
regional locations. The results for the London only subsample are consistent with the
previous results. Hotels rated as excellent were the most likely to disclose relative to
the base category. Hotels rated as second and third best respectively were equally likely
to disclose. The final regression for the regional dataset focuses on provincial locations
(Provincial BI). The results do not exhibit the exact linearity of the London results. While a
strong statistical relationship exists between disclosure and TripAdvisor ratings for hotels
rated as 4.5 and 4, this weakens for lower ratings11.
The third series of estimates (III) considers the international dataset only. An interna-
tional comparison provides an insight into the efficacy of the TripAdvisor signal outside
the UK and Ireland. An analysis of major international destinations also allowed us to
assess a homogenous cluster on a global scale. As previously shown, the rate of disclosure
is lower when compared to the regional sample. We do, however, find a similar downward
monotonic pattern. Similarly, robust statistical relationships are reported.
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Two specific spatial effects are apparent: hotels in Rome and Paris are between 12%
and 18% less likely to disclose. Given this finding, and as both Paris and Rome represent
substantial subsamples, the second two regressions for the international estimates (III)
investigate the likelihood of disclosure exclusively in these locations. For Paris, a recurrent
downward disclosure relationship exists, but the rate of disclosure falls sharply for the
second-best rating category (4.5). For Rome, a disclosure threshold is observed, with all
hotels rated at 4 or above more likely to disclose. This decision approximates the same
probability, 47.5% to 50%, and is independent of the rating. These findings point toward
the weakening power of the TripAdvisor signal outside the regional market.
7. TripAdvisor Ratings and the Salience of Disclosure: The Case of
Holiday Catalogues
Hotel websites are standalone entities which display a great deal of heterogeneity
in their design. This complexity can mask nondisclosure of TripAdvisor ratings, or any
other information a hotel may choose to veil. In contrast, holiday catalogues—which also
provide TripAdvisor ratings—present hotels in a homogeneous way. These are compiled
by a third party and presented consecutively, meaning that variations in disclosure are
salient. An example of this format for a disclosure and nondisclosure is provided in the
Appendix A. In a holiday catalogue, the absence of a TripAdvisor rating is likely to be
highly salient, and this will increase pressure to disclose.
To investigate whether this increased salience is associated with greater disclosure
of TripAdvisor ratings, we collect data from two holiday catalogues—Thomson and
Jet2Holidays. The Thomson catalogue consisted of hotels and resorts included in the
2017 Spain, Portugal and Cape Verde catalogue. All hotels and resorts in the Summer Holi-
days 2017 catalogue were considered for Jet2Holiday. Two critical assumptions underpin
this analysis. First, we assume that hotels can affect the disclosure decision of the third
party and that the presentation of information in catalogues will involve the agreement of
hotels as well as catalogue editors. If hotels would prefer disclosure to be voluntary, they
can negotiate this, but then highly-rated hotels would want to disclose their TripAdvisor
ratings, and so the unravelling process would begin. Second, we assume that audiences of
both online (website) and offline (catalogue) are equally sophisticated.
Data were available for 790 hotels across both catalogues for a total of thirty-two
European destinations. In contrast to hotel websites, disclosure is almost complete. Except
for minor omissions, the Thomson catalogue provides full disclosure: a TripAdvisor rating
is included for all 179 hotels in the catalogue, including 6% with a rating of 3.5 or under. A
TripAdvisor rating is not provided for a minority of hotels that were recently refurbished
(4) or opened (5). In the absence of disclosure, a justification is offered (a refurbishment
or new hotel symbol). A larger sample is available for 611 decisions from the Jet2Holiday
catalogue. A disclosure rate of 97% is recorded. The distribution of hotels in the Jet2Holiday
catalogues for each category was: 5 (8), 4.5 (228), 4 (280), 3.5 (84), 3 (9), <3 (2). Figure 2
displays the higher level of disclosure in this context for the Jet2Holiday sample and the
minimal rate of nondisclosure in the lowest rated category.
To evaluate the likelihood of a catalogue disclosure, specific point estimates are
obtained using the same specification adopted for the previous regressions. The rating
categories of 3 and <3 were merged and used to enable comparisons with the TripAdvisor
rating categories. Relative to these lowest rated hotels, those ranked greater than or equal
to 3.5 were not more likely to exhibit selective disclosure (all p’s >0.17). As expected,
there were no differences in this context, in which nondisclosure was highly salient (KW:
χ2(4) = 3.74, p = 0.44).
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8. Nondisclosure and Motivations
Although the strict predicti ns of unravelling theory fail, it is likely there are many
rea ns for the observed no isclosure. Firstly, hoteliers could rely on their industry
certification wh n TripAdvisor ca ts them in a light which is inconsistent with their star.
These star certifications are not based on custom r ex erience, but on factors such as food
options, amenities, room sizes and other facilities (spas, gyms, etc.). The certification is
coincidentally over the same numeric range as TripAdvisor, even though these scales are
independent and do not necessarily reflect the same aspects of the business. This industry
assessment could act as a reference point in determining disclosure. While these standards
vary across markets, many hotels appear reluctant to disclose TripAdvisor ratings that do
not match or exceed their certification. While it is important to restate that star certification
and TripAdvisor ratings are on different scales, it is not improbable that consumers could
conflate the measures, and that managers want to avoid this.
Secondly, managers may adopt general rules-of-thumb for TripAdvisor disclosures.
For example, managers could believe consumers would interpret nondisclosure as equiva-
l nt to a 3 or 3.5 rating. If so, the no (or very few) hotels with that ra i g or less would
disclose. While we do n have any vide ce that general dec ion rule such as this exist
within the industry, managers holding differing beliefs of w t constitutes a reasonable
rating for consumers could explain this pattern.
Secondly, strategic behaviour is a plausible explanation for the pattern of disclosure.
Although nondisclosure should be equally revealing, ratings may not be disclosed if man-
agers believe consumers will not interpret nondisclosure in the worst possible light. Recent
experimental evidence suggests that consumers interpret undisclosed information “chari-
tably”. The optimal policy for service providers with an average rating is often to conceal
it [17]. Assuming that hoteliers profit from nondisclosure at the expense of the consumer,
the findings are consistent with models of limited strategic thinking. Brown et al. [25]
arg e that if ellers anticipat that consumers have very limit d ability to ake strategic
infer nces, provid i l choos not to reveal information. This interpreta ion is strength-
en d by sig ificantly higher levels of disclosu e i an alter ative sales setting; while these
disclosures may be targeted at more so histicated consumers, the elevated level of disclo-
sure in catalogues indicates that the potential for hotels to behave strategically and obscure
their TripAdvisor rating increases when disclosure choices deviate from set formats.
It is plausible that elite hoteliers choose to rely on reputation or branding rather than
on third party rating systems. In the regional sample, 15% of hotels awarded the rare
“excellent” rating did not disclose, as did 36% of the international sample. While this is only
a small number of hotels, several elite premises choose to ignore their excellent (and rare)
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TripAdvisor rating. As discussed, recent research has shown that when luxury options exist
in markets (e.g., education, restaurants), providers can adopt humble disclosure strategies
by not sporting their elite credentials. As our context has ample luxury options with many
well-established hotels, is it important to explore this possibility further.
To consider the possibility of systematic non-disclosure behaviour by the very best,
we accessed data for hotels that are not merely elite but are also global leaders. Following
the same procedure previously adopted, we verified 157 TripAdvisor disclosures for
hotels certified as five stars and also included in the 2017 Forbes Travel Guide—Star
Award Winners. These hotels were located across twenty-one countries globally. Of
these exceptional hotels, 48% disclosed. This is a lower rate than that of the regional and
international data for hotels rated as both 5 and 4.5. The Forbes Travel Guide contains
47 hotels with a five-star certification and the maximum TripAdvisor rating. While no
statistical difference exists between the disclosure rates for the Forbes data and hotels in
the international sample (χ2 = 1.15, p = 0.28), the disclosure rate varies from elite regional
hotels (χ2 = 9.72, p = 0.00). Thus, compared to our regional sample, the most outstanding
hotels, many of whom have a long history of excellence, appear to take exceptional reviews
as a given, Either they do not see the need to disclose a TripAdvisor rating or believe it
might be demeaning to do so.
An Uncharted Motivation—Disclosure Expectations
If consumers are confident that other consumers care about TripAdvisor ratings,
and that the managers know this, then an undisclosed rating is worrying. But to the
degree that consumers do not know what other consumers want, or what managers know,
then a missing rating becomes increasingly ambiguous or has a low “signal value”. In
general, uncertainty concerning local norms, what others are expecting or how others
value information can make non-disclosure less damaging, even from the perspective of
strategically rational consumers.
A noticeable result is the higher rate of disclosure for regional hotels. There are
possible rational explanations for this result, indicating disclosure motivations that fit
within the theoretical framework of unravelling theory. One possibility derives from the
concept of ‘common knowledge’ [36,37]. This entails that not only does every consumer
know something, but they also know that all possible consumers know it too. In terms
of unravelling theory and hotels, managers must believe that every consumer will want
to know the TripAdvisor rating of their hotel and that every consumer knows that every
consumer wants to know the rating. If common knowledge conditions are weakened,
it becomes less crucial for a hotel to disclose because consumers will not know whether
non-disclosure is due to low ratings, or because other consumers do not expect to see
this information.
The common knowledge assumption is less likely to hold for international destinations
that attract diverse consumers, compared to regional destinations which attract a more
homogeneous group of consumers. With respect to international destinations, for instance,
a consumer from New York booking a hotel in Tokyo will not be sure whether a guest from
Rome seeks out TripAdvisor ratings. Notice that this is true even if the guests from Rome
actually do want to see the TripAdvisor rating—if the New York traveller does not know
this then she can interpret non-disclosure as being due to the hotel catering for guests from
other destinations (see [37], for extensive discussion of this issue). Consumers from the
relatively culturally homogeneous UK or Ireland, however, could be confident about local
norms and what others from their region anticipate.
To analyse whether there is a difference in disclosure when disclosable information
is recognised and when it is not, we introduced data from a market where the common
knowledge assumption is unlikely to hold. By this, we are assuming that consumers
have little to no knowledge that information concerning product quality exists to be dis-
closed. TrustPilot is a ratings provider much like TripAdvisor, but is relatively unfamiliar
(especially when the study was conducted) and so consumers would not expect a Trust-
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Pilot rating from service providers. The differences in the strength of these signals are
corroborated by comparing their ‘interest over time’ using Google Trends. We evaluate
disclosures for non-bank financial service firms (NBFS) who received online appraisals
from the review firm TrustPilot. This allowed us to measure if disclosure patterns vary
when consumers are unlikely to realise there is an evaluation to disclose. Theoretically,
unravelling will occur only when consumers know an evaluation exists, because only then
can consumers recognise nondisclosure and expect other consumers to recognise it too.
Consequently, ratings from unfamiliar platforms should be disclosed only when they are
very high. Comparing disclosures allows us to consider naïve disclosure behaviour as both
signals are of contrasting strength; the disclosure of known/anticipated (TripAdvisor) sig-
nals are compared to unknown/unexpected (TrustPilot) signals. If companies are thinking
strategically about the response of customers, they should theoretically always disclose
their TripAdvisor ratings, but will be cautious about disclosing their TrustPilot ratings.
At the time of data collection, TrustPilot users rated their experience on an ordinal
quality scale from low (0) to high (10). We analyse these data as we did those for TripAd-
visor12. Verification took place for 489 firms. We classified the firms into half-unit rating
intervals where adequate samples exist: 10–9.6 (114), 9.5–9.1 (164), 9–8.6 (91), 8.5–8.1 (39),
8–7 (38), ≤7 (43). The total rate of disclosure across both the UK/Ireland and the USA was
63%. Figure 3 shows the proportion of disclosures for the sample at each rating interval.
A normative unravelling prediction is not included in Figure 3 given that we regard the
TrustPilot signals not to be anticipated by a consumer.
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Figure 3. Rating Disclosures by Trustpilot Category.
The aggregate pattern is similar to that for TripAdvisor ratings (see Figure 1)13, show-
ing the same monotonically decreasing disclosure relationship. As expected, at least
one category stochastically dominates another in Figure 3 (KW: χ2(5) = 83.80, p=0.00).
Chi-square tests reveal differences across the disclosure proportions—first and second cate-
gories (χ2 = 10.53, p = 0.01), second and third (χ2 = 3.81, p = 0.05), fourth and fifth (χ2 = 3.82,
p = 0.05) and fifth and sixth (χ2 = 8.83, p = 0.00). To yield specific probabilistic estimates
regarding the likelihood of a disclosure, we have specified a similar probit model to the
previous regressions14. Relative to the worst ranked firms (omitted category), firms ranked
in the highest category of 10-9.6, are 88% more likely to disclose their Trustpilot rating
(RSE = 0.089, p= 0.00). The monotonic relationship observable in Figure 3 is recognised in
the point estimates: the second category is 70% more likely to disclose (RSE = 0.091, p= 0.00)
and the third and fourth are 59% (RSE = 0.098, p= 0.00) and 55% (RSE = 0.109, p= 0.00)
more likely to disclose, respectively. Relative to the lowest category, those ranked 8-7, in
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the second lowest class interval, are 37% more likely to disclose a 5% level (RSE = 0.115,
p = 0.02).
Those with high TrustPilot ratings generally disclose, those with low ratings generally
do not. This suggests the basis for disclosure is not primarily determined by concerns
regarding how consumers will respond to non-disclosure, but rather to how consumers
will react to what is disclosed. If managers believe that the information they hold is not
good enough, they do not disclose it. These findings are consistent with Sah & Read ([17],
who show that when asked to justify (non-) disclosure, respondents were concerned almost
entirely with the impression made by disclosed information, and rarely discussed the
impact of undisclosed information.
9. Theoretical Discussion
There are many situations in which information providers can make it easy for con-
sumers to acquire relevant information, or to make it difficult. This is the kind of situation
we studied. TripAdvisor ratings are available to consumers, but they may not bother to look
them up. In contrast to Mathios [30], therefore, the nondisclosures we observe arise not in
a situation of pure asymmetric information, but in one of unbalanced information. Despite
this, the unravelling argument still holds. By imposing differential costs on different classes
of information, managers make it easier for consumers to access some information and
harder to access other information. Even putting features at the top of a list makes it
more likely consumers will choose an option based on that feature. Managers will do this
because they want consumers to choose based on their strongest characteristics and may
want to hide or shroud less favourable features. Not listing a feature at all is the logical
culmination of this reasoning.
Can nondisclosure be explained without proposing failures of strategic rationality on
the part of either information providers or consumers? Unravelling depends on several
conditions. All participants (managers and consumers) must be strategically rational.
Managers must be able to credibly provide information to consumers at no cost. All
consumers must have the same order of preferences concerning that information. Moreover,
there must be common knowledge: if some participants do not believe these conditions
apply, they may rationally make what appear to be non-equilibrium choices. In turn, this
can change the optimal choice for other service providers. Similarly, random choices by
some change the rational choices of others. For instance, if consumers do not punish
nondisclosure, then a rational manager will withhold information. If some hotels do
not disclose, then managers who might otherwise disclose can hide themselves in the
thicket of non-disclosers. If non-equilibrium nondisclosures are frequent, then information
receivers are sensible to treat non-disclosers as ‘not as bad’ as those who disclose a relatively
low rating.
Consider the disclosure choice of a single five-star hotel with TripAdvisor rating of
four. Assume the manager believes consumers are fully rational but is faced with a market
in which others have made the disclosure decisions summarized in our study. The average
TripAdvisor ratings of non-disclosing five-star hotels is approximately 4.1. A rational
consumer will infer this as the expected quality. Even a somewhat risk averse consumer
might rationally choose a non-disclosing five-star hotel over a disclosing five-star hotel
with a TripAdvisor rating of four. It is plausible that an equilibrium emerges in which
hotels with high TripAdvisor ratings are not disclosing them.
This explanation does not address why a hotel with a TripAdvisor rating of five
might not disclose. Unravelling theory assumes that managers care only about ensuring
consumers reach the most favourable assessment of their service, and, crucially, that they
can do this through disclosing information. It is possible, however, that managers might
not disclose because they believe that the very act of disclosure is demeaning, or have
some other principled basis for non-disclosure. Some hoteliers may have preferred not
to disclose TripAdvisor ratings for these arguably rational reasons. Any ‘noise’ in the
disclosure environment produced in this way changes the context for other hoteliers and
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hoteliers and consumers, making nondisclosure a more viable option for the former, and
charitable options more credible for the latter. In sum, exotic disclosure strategies adopted
by elite types could interfere with the information environment for the population of
potential disclosers.
Nondisclosure may also be a preferred strategy for managers because the worst
information that could be inferred remains in the imagination of consumers. Even hotels
with very good ratings, if delved into deeply, can be associated with a minority of poor
reviews that might tarnish the hotel’s reputation. Disclosure of positive information may
direct consumers to small blotches on an otherwise immaculate copybook. This effect
of salient reality could be a powerful reason for not disclosing even when theory says
managers should.
10. Conclusions and Implications
This paper contributes to the strategic disclosure (and non-disclosure) literature by
investigating a fast-paced consumer market. We investigate TripAdvisor disclosures
regionally and internationally. We report monotonic disclosure relationships, with hotels
more likely to disclose higher TripAdvisor ratings. Consistent with past studies, we
find that the full disclosure prediction is incomplete. The average TripAdvisor rating
of disclosing hotels is not substantially greater than that of non-disclosing ones. This
implies a failure of unravelling theory. Notably, even the highest TripAdvisor ratings were
not disclosed in every case. We also detect an interaction between TripAdvisor rating
disclosures and a hotel’s star certification; five- and four-star hotels are reluctant to disclose
TripAdvisor ratings numerically below their star certification.
Our additional data provides further insights. Firstly, TripAdvisor ratings are almost
always revealed in catalogues, when their absence would be salient due to the immediate
comparability of other hotels. This result reinforces the importance of the sales context
in regulating disclosure. Secondly, a small cohort of elite hotels do not disclose their
excellent TripAdvisor ratings. When we investigated the disclosure behaviour of the most
prestigious internationals, this pattern persists. Finally, we make a theoretical point relating
to consumers’ prior knowledge of signals. We control for expectations and identify a
similar disclosure pattern with an analogous but unfamiliar rating platform. We take this
as evidence that, even if consumers are not anticipating a disclosure, similar patterns arise.
Irrespective of the motivations underlying non-disclosure, failing to provide con-
sumers with relevant information can have practical implications. Given the limited
number of lower rated hotels that disclose, the results have consequences for consumer
groups. As suggested, whether or not consumers can infer the implications of nondisclo-
sure is highly questionable. Behavioural decision research has identified that individuals
face psychological barriers when required to interpret missing information rationally. Thus,
advocating consumer caution in online markets and emphasising the importance of seek-
ing additional information (i.e., incurring greater search costs) is a clear recommendation
emerging from the findings.
Finally, our results have theoretical implications for unravelling theory. The results
posit questions for researchers who evaluate the strength of signals in markets, and their
expectation by a signal receiver. While we show that common signals generally diffuse in
similar patterns, different shades of disclosure are present across markets. One can only
speculate why this is the case—anticipation of signals, culture or language differences
may play a role. Our comparison of signals based on the alternative feedback platform
TrustPilot indicates that anticipation of a signal appears to be independent of the disclosure
decision whenever a quality range exists. Whether anticipated or not, it is unlikely that
unflattering information will be disclosed unless nondisclosure is highly salient.
It is important to note the limitations of this study and directions for future research.
Firstly, our extensive dataset and subsequent test is possible due to publicly available
information; while the information environment investigated can be thought of as un-
balanced rather than asymmetric, any imperfections to the information structure can be
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remedied by a savvy consumer willing to incur search costs. Hence, while significant
datasets can be assembled, the strength of this test is limited. Acquiring data on differential
search costs for consumers and how they go about gathering information could offer
stronger demand-side implications. As such, only limited inferences can be made when
interpreting the motivations for nondisclosure, and we simply offer interpretations for the
pattern observed.
Secondly, we do not offer any insights regarding how a manager’s expectations of
consumer sophistication relate to disclosure. This omission raises interesting questions
for future research as hotel disclosure decisions may relate to how hotels estimate the
shrewdness of their market and the extent to which they are willing to incur search
costs. It would be a fruitful exercise to understand the managerial beliefs of consumers
through accessing survey data. Furthermore, we assume that managers hold decision
making autonomy for marketing operations. These limitations suggest various avenues for
future research.
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Notes
1 In the UK, the sector is the third biggest employer. In 2017 it generated over 72 billion of gross added value to the UK economy
(Ignite Economics, 2018) [38].
2 Riley [7] provides a formal treatment of information revelation and the unravelling result.
3 To our knowledge, all TripAdvisor hoaxes have involved restaurants and contexts where premises have been subject to limited
public scrutiny.
4 Note that this is not always true for all domains investigating disclosure. With salad dressing, to give one example, it is likely
t t some co sumers prefer high fat dressings while others prefer low fat dressings.
5 The summated rating for a hotel offered by TripAdvisor is more sophisticated than an average rating of all contributions. The
system incorporates ratings to determine overall satisfaction, which is weighted based on the recency of a review.
6 One exception was made. Kerry is not a city but is a primary tourist region in the Republic of Ireland.
7 TripAdvisor have specifically developed a content integrity policy to protect against fraudulent reviewer behaviour. They
guarantee that “businesses are not able to influence TripAdvisor to improve their reviews, ratings or ranking” This policy can be
accessed online at https://www.tripadvisor.ie/pages/content_integrity_policy.html (accessed on 19 May 2018).
8 For illustrative purposes, hotels ranked less than three are treated as being the “lowest”, and hence the ratings at which a hotel
should, according to the full disclosure prediction, be indifferent between disclosing or not disclosing. Technically, however, only
the lowest possible ratings (1.5) should be indifferent to disclosure. Only four hotels in the dataset, however, received this rating.
9 Diagnostic checks on all regressions were conducted to ensure that the model is appropriately specified. A link test on each
probit regression reports non-significant results (p > 0.90 for all regressions), indicating that the generalised model does not suffer
from systematic specification errors.
10 For instance, the Irish government historically charged a lower VAT rate of 9% on tourist-related services. Given the sample size
of Irish hotels, it is not feasible to estimate a probit regression. It is noteworthy that evaluating the unravelling principle for both
Irish and UK markets using a linear probability model (LPM) reports analogous results. Analysing just the Irish market alone
with a LPM, reveals a similar linear relationship to that of the UK sample. All Irish hotels rated as 5 make a voluntary disclosure,
while hotels with a rating of 4.5, 4 and 3.5 have voluntary disclosure rates of 63%, 51% and 17%, respectively. None of the lowest
ranked Irish hotels (all rated 3.5) make a disclosure.
11 Rating 5 is dropped from this analysis as it produces a perfect prediction for the dependent variable.
12 For an admission to occur, a firm must fulfil at least one of the two criteria: (i) they explicitly publish their TrustPilot rating on
their homepage or (ii) they refer to their TrustPilot performance. Data were accessed on 504 NBFS firms. Seven specific product
categories were identifiable: pension/investment (57); insurance (138); short term personal and business loans (124); debt services
and tax advisory (48); currency and exchange (75) and firms such as price comparison, credit score or switching services (47).
13 The rates of disclosure for the UK/Irish sample are: 88% (10–9.6), 80% (9.5–9.1), 61% (9–8.6), 57% (8.5–8.1), 27% (8–7) and 0%
(≤7). For the U.S., the rates of disclosure are: 72% (10–9.6), 55% (9.5–9.1), 56% (9–8.6), 55% (8.5–8.1) and 38% (≤8).
14 An addition to the model is that it introduces a vector of controls relating to the primary product of the firm. No significant
results are reported for firms offering alternative financial products.
Games 2021, 12, 73 19 of 20
References
1. Viscusi, W.K. A note on “lemons” markets with quality certification. Bell J. Econ. 1978, 9, 277–279. [CrossRef]
2. Grossman, S.J. The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality. J. Law Econ. 1981, 24,
461–483. [CrossRef]
3. Milgrom, P.R. Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications. Bell J. Econ. 1981, 12, 380. [CrossRef]
4. Jovanovic, B. Truthful Disclosure of Information. Bell J. Econ. 1982, 13, 36. [CrossRef]
5. Farrell, J. Voluntary disclosure: Robustness of the unraveling result, and comments on its im-portance. In Antitrust and Regulation;
Grieson, R.E., Ed.; Lexington Books: Lanham, MD, USA, 1986.
6. Milgrom, P. What the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets. J. Econ. Perspect. 2008, 22, 115–131. [CrossRef]
7. Riley, J.G. Essential Microeconomics; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2012.
8. Bergh, D.D.; Connelly, B.L.; Ketchen, D.J., Jr.; Shannon, L.M. Signalling theory and equilibrium in strategic management research:
An assessment and a research agenda. J. Manag. Stud. 2014, 51, 1334–1360. [CrossRef]
9. Vermeulen, I.; Seegers, D. Tried and tested: The impact of online hotel reviews on consumer consideration. Tour. Manag. 2009, 30,
123–127. [CrossRef]
10. Jeacle, I.; Carter, C. In TripAdvisor we trust: Rankings, calculative regimes and abstract systems. Account. Organ. Soc. 2011, 36,
293–309. [CrossRef]
11. Sparks, B.A.; Browning, V. The impact of online reviews on hotel booking intentions and percep-tion of trust. Tour. Manag. 2011,
32, 1310–1323. [CrossRef]
12. Casaló, L.V.; Flavián, C.; Guinalíu, M.; Ekinci, Y. Do online hotel rating schemes influence booking behaviors? Int. J. Hosp. Manag.
2015, 49, 28–36. [CrossRef]
13. Park, S.; Nicolau, J.L. Asymmetric effects of online consumer reviews. Ann. Tour. Res. 2015, 50, 67–83. [CrossRef]
14. Torres, E.N.; Singh, D.; Robertson-Ring, A. Consumer reviews and the creation of booking transac-tion value: Lessons from the
hotel industry. Int. J. Hosp. Manag. 2015, 50, 77–83. [CrossRef]
15. Xie, K.L.; Chen, C.; Wu, S. Online consumer review factors affecting offline hotel popularity: Evidence from tripadvisor. J. Travel
Tour. Mark. 2016, 33, 211–223. [CrossRef]
16. Viglia, G.; Minazzi, R.; Buhalis, D. The influence of e-word-of-mouth on hotel occupancy rate. Int. J. Contemp. Hosp. Manag. 2016,
28, 2035–2051. [CrossRef]
17. Sah, S.; Read, D. Mind the (information) gap: Strategic nondisclosure by marketers and interven-tions to increase consumer
deliberation. J. Exp. Psychol. Appl. 2020, 26, 432. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
18. Frank, R.H. Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions; Norton: New York, NY, USA, 1988.
19. Feltovich, N.; Harbaugh, R.; To, T. Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling. RAND J. Econ. 2002, 33, 630. [CrossRef]
20. Akerlof, G.A. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Q. J. Econ. 1970, 84, 488–500. [CrossRef]
21. Dye, R.A.; Finn, M. Equilibrium Voluntary Disclosures When Firms Possess Random Multi-Dimensional Private Information. In
Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski.; Antle, R., Liang, P.J., Gjesdal, F., Eds.; Springer: New York, NY, USA, 2007;
pp. 53–72.
22. Dranove, D.; Jin, G.Z. Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice. J. Econ. Lit. 2010, 48, 935–963. [CrossRef]
23. Sah, S.; Cain, D.M.; Loewenstein, G. Confessing one’s sins but still committing them: Transparency and the failure of disclosure.
In Behavioural Public Policy; Oliver, A.J., Ed.; Cambridge University Press (CUP): Cambridge, UK, 2014; pp. 148–164.
24. Bazerman, M.H.; Moore, D.A. Judgment in Managerial Decision Making; John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2009.
25. Brown, A.; Camerer, C.F.; Lovallo, D. To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office. Am. Econ.
J. Microecon. 2012, 4, 1–26. [CrossRef]
26. Loewenstein, G.; Sunstein, C.R.; Golman, R. Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything. Annu. Rev. Econ. 2014, 6,
391–419. [CrossRef]
27. Ispano, A.; Schwardmann, P. Behavioural Economics. Competition over Cursed Consumers, CE-Sifo Working Paper Series,
No. 7046. 2017. Available online: https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2018/working-paper/competition-over-cursed-
consumers (accessed on 19 May 2018).
28. Sah, S.; Read, D. Disclosure and the Dog That Didn’t Bark: Consumers Are Too Forgiving of Missing Information. Acad. Manag.
Proc. 2017, 1, 12839. [CrossRef]
29. Farrell, J.; Rabin, M. Cheap Talk. J. Econ. Perspect. 1996, 10, 103–118. [CrossRef]
30. Mathios, A.D. The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market. J. Law
Econ. 2000, 43, 651–678. [CrossRef]
31. Jin, G.Z.; Leslie, P. The Effects of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurants Hy-giene Report Cards. Q. J. Econ.
2003, 118, 409–451. [CrossRef]
32. Jin, G.Z. Competition and disclosure incentives: An empirical study of HMOs. RAND J. Econ. 2005, 36, 93–112. [PubMed]
33. Luca, M.; Smith, J. Strategic disclosure: The case of business school rankings. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2015, 112, 17–25. [CrossRef]
34. Bederson, B.B.; Jin, G.Z.; Leslie, P.; Quinn, A.J.; Zou, B. Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signal-ing and Countersignaling. Am.
Econ. J. Microecon. 2016, 10, 41–66. [CrossRef]
35. Harbaugh, R.; To, T. False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad. J. Math. Econ. 2020, 87, 43–55. [CrossRef]
36. Lewis, D. Convention; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1969.
Games 2021, 12, 73 20 of 20
37. Chwe, M.S.Y. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2001.
38. Ignite Economics. The Economic Contribution of the UK Hospitality Industry. 2018. Available online: https://www.ukhospitality.
org.uk/page/EconomicContributionoftheUKHospitalityIndustry2018 (accessed on 4 November 2018).
